In cooperative dynamic games with non-transferable payoffs, the players' agreed-upon cooperative actions would determine the resulting payoff that each player receives. This article develops a mechanism for the derivation of individual player's payoff functions in cooperative stochastic dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs. This is the first time that individual player's payoff functions are characterized in an analytically derivable form in such a framework. An illustrative example is provided.
Introduction
In cooperative games, players negotiate to establish an agreement on how to act and assign their payoffs. A necessary condition is that the agreement must satisfy individual rationality. To verify individual rationality, individual players' payoff functions have to be derived. In the case when the game is dynamic and stochastic while payoffs are nontransferable, analytically tractable individual payoff functions, though difficult to be obtained, are needed for this verification process. Yeung (2004) provided a formulation to characterize the players' individual payoffs in continuous-time cooperative stochastic differential with non-transferable payoffs. In this article, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of individual player's payoff functions for discrete-time cooperative stochastic dynamic games. An illustrative example is given.
Game Framework
Consider the general − T stage − n person nonzero-sum discrete-time stochastic dynamic game with initial state 0 1 x . The state space of the game is m R X ∈ and the state dynamics of the game is characterized by the stochastic difference equation: is the control vector of player i at stage k , X x k ∈ is the state, and k θ is a set of statistically independent random variables.
The objective of player i is , for K k ∈ , denote the value functions indicating the expected payoff to player i over the stages from k to T . The theorems characterizing a Nash of the game (2.1)-(2.2) can be found in standard textbooks (for instance see Theorem 13.1 in Yeung and Petrosyan (2012)).
For the sake of exposition, we sidestep the issue of multiple equilibria and focus on solvable games in which a particular noncooperative Nash equilibrium is chosen by the players in the entire game.
Cooperation Scheme and Individual Payoffs
Now consider the case when the players agree to cooperate and enhance their payoffs according to an agreed-upon cooperative scheme. In the scheme, the players would adopt the agreed-upon cooperative strategies which would directly determine the payoffs of the players.
Optimal Cooperative Strategies
To obtain a group optimal outcome one has to consider the derivation of a set of cooperative strategies using payoff weights in which the players agree to adopt a vector of constant payoff weights ) , , , (
and Jorgensen (1984), Hamalainen et al (1986) , Leitmann (1974) , and Yeung and Petrosyan (2005) provided analysis along this line. Conditional upon an agreed-upon vector of weights α , the agents' optimal cooperative strategies can be generated by solving the following stochastic control problem of maximizing their joint weighted expected payoff: 
Proof. The results in (3.2)-(3.3) comes directly from the stochastic optimal control techniques (See Basar and Olsder (1999) and Yeung and Petrosyan (2012) ). ■ Substituting the optimal control ) ( { ) (
into the state dynamics (2.1), one can obtain the dynamics of the cooperative trajectory as:
We use
to denote the value of the state at stage k generated by (3.4), where
is the set of realizable values of
gives the expected weighted cooperative payoff over the stages from k to T if
Individual Payoff under Cooperation
Given that all players are adopting the cooperative strategies in Section 3.1 the expected payoff of player i under cooperation can be obtained as:
To allow the derivation of the functions ) , ( 
Invoking (3.5), we have: 
(3.9) Hence Theorem 3.2 follows. ■ For individual rationality to be maintained at the outset, it is required that:
(3.10)
For individual rationality to be maintained throughout all the stages κ ∈ k , it is required that:
If there exists an agreed-upon set of solution weights α that satisfies (3.11) the cooperative solution satisfies both individual rationality and group optimality throughout the cooperative duration.
An Illustration
We consider a non-transferable payoff version of the game in Yeung and Petrosyan (2010). Consider two economies which can extract a renewable resource. The planning horizon for resource extraction begins at stage 1 and ends at stage 3 for these two extractors. Let is to maximize the present value of the expected payoff: subject to (4.1). Invoking Theorem 3.1, one can characterize the optimal controls in the stochastic dynamic programming problem (4.1) and (4.3). In particular, a set of control strategies ) ( { ) (
provides an optimal solution to the problem (4.1) and (4.3) if there exist functions :
, such that the following recursive relations are satisfied:
(4.4) Performing the indicated maximization in (4.4) yields the optimal cooperative strategies:
, are constants given in (A.4), (A.9) and (A.12) in Appendix A. Proof. See Appendix A. ■ Using (4.5) and Proposition 4.1, the optimal cooperative strategies of the agents can be expressed as: 
The value function 
Concluding Remarks
This article develops a mechanism for the derivation of individual player's payoff functions in cooperative stochastic dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs. The analysis can be readily applied to cooperative dynamic games by removing the stochastic elements. Further applications of the results in discrete-time dynamic games are expected.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 4.1.
Consider first the last stage, that is stage 3. Invoking that
Performing the indicated maximization in (A.1) yields the optimal cooperative strategies in stage 3 as: Performing the indicated maximization in (A.6) yields the optimal cooperative strategies in stage 2 as:
Substituting (A.7) into (A. Q.E.D.
